Evidence from two studies demonstrates that observers tend to.perceive a false consensus with respect to the relative commonness of their own behavioral choices. This phenomenon was replicated across a variety of behaviors. This bias was not related, however, to subjects' trait inferences of the typical person who would choose a particular alternative. Neither estimated commonness of responses nor subjects' own behavioral choice provided an adequate explanation of the obtained differences in attributional inferences. Results of the two studies show that people make more extreme and confident trait ratings about evaluatively positive behavior, irrespective of their own behavioral choice. Subjects' trait ratings were in accordance with Ross's (1977) proposal (i.e., more extreme ratings about dissimilar others) only when subjects rated their own behavioral choice relatively unfavorably compared with the behavioral alternative. Implications of these findings for previous investigations dealing with the false consensus effect are outlined. Finally, evaluative and motivational mechanisms are proposed that should be included in research on social inference and attributional processes.
Evidence from two studies demonstrates that observers tend to.perceive a false consensus with respect to the relative commonness of their own behavioral choices. This phenomenon was replicated across a variety of behaviors. This bias was not related, however, to subjects' trait inferences of the typical person who would choose a particular alternative. Neither estimated commonness of responses nor subjects' own behavioral choice provided an adequate explanation of the obtained differences in attributional inferences. Results of the two studies show that people make more extreme and confident trait ratings about evaluatively positive behavior, irrespective of their own behavioral choice. Subjects' trait ratings were in accordance with Ross's (1977) proposal (i.e., more extreme ratings about dissimilar others) only when subjects rated their own behavioral choice relatively unfavorably compared with the behavioral alternative. Implications of these findings for previous investigations dealing with the false consensus effect are outlined. Finally, evaluative and motivational mechanisms are proposed that should be included in research on social inference and attributional processes.
Beliefs held by individuals about the beliefs of the generalized "other" have been investigated since the mid-1930s (e.g., Hayes, 1936; Thomson, 1941; Travers, 1941; Wallen, 1941 Wallen, , 1943 . Results of these studies suggest that people operate within a "false" social world, or at least one quite different from that observed by the social scientist. Fields and Schuman (1976) extended these findings and showed that people tend to believe that others think the same as oneself. More recently, Hansen and Donoghue (1977) and Ross, Greene, and House (1977) studied this phenomenon in the context of attribution theory. Ross et al. demonstrated that people tend to perceive a "false consensus" with respect to the relative commonness of their own responses. Furthermore, they related this perceptual bias to attributional processes. Their findings showed that people estimated particular responses to be relatively common and relatively unrevealing concerning the actor's distinguishing this study was supported by a grant from the Dutch Ministerie van Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene.
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Requests for reprints should be sent to Joop van der Pligt, who is now at the Department of Psychology, Washington Singer Laboratories, Exeter EX4 4QG, England. personal dispositions when the responses in question were similar to their own responses; by contrast, responses differing from one's own responses were perceived to be relatively uncommon and revealing of the person displaying that specific behavior. More tentatively, Ross et al. related their findings to Jones and Nisbett's (1971) divergent-perspectives hypothesis, that is, that people tend to explain their own behavior in more situational terms, whereas as observers they explain the behavior of other actors as the product of personal dispositions. Ross et al. (1977) suggested that people's perceived consensus partly determines the causal attributions of the behavior in question. This suggestion is in accordance with the theoretical proposals by Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelly (1967) that atypical, counternormative, or unexpected responses in a given situation lead to more dispositional inferences about the actor than relatively common responses. Empirical support for this proposal was provided by Harris (1967) and McArthur (1972) .
A number of studies attempted to investigate the relation between consensus and attributional processes. Some of these provided subjects with consensus information (samplebased consensus), others focused on the effects of subjects' perception of consensus (self-based consensus). Generally, the studies that provided subjects with consensus information showed that consensus manipulations have hardly any effect, or at least far less effect than would be expected on the basis of Kelley's formulations (e.g., Miller, Gillen, Schenker, & Radlove, 1973; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, & Reed, 1976) . Major (1980) showed that when people can choose information from an array of organized stimulus information that corresponds to discrete instances of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency, consensus information is relied upon less than both distinctiveness and consistency information. Eisen's (1979) findings suggest that perceived consensus (self-based consensus) is not related to attributional preferences. Hansen and Donoghue (1977) , however, found that both self-and sample-based consensus influence the kind of attribution one makes; furthermore, self-based consensus was found to be the more influential of the two. Similarly, Wells and Harvey (1977) and Kulik and Taylor (1980) found that consensus information is an important variable in attributional processes. These conflicting findings suggest that the exact relations among perceptions of consensus, attributional inferences, and people's own behavioral preferences are still unclear.
In this article we focus on two formulations that provide a serious challenge to Ross's proposal that the perception of a false consensus could be related to Jones and Nisbett's divergent-perspectives hypothesis.
First, Ross et al. (1977) suggested that "selective exposure" could result in the perception of a false consensus; that is, we tend to know and associate with people who share our background, experiences, interests, values, and outlook. Although selective exposure could be an underlying mechanism of the perception of a false consensus, it undermines Ross's proposal that attributional differences may arise from attributors' misconceptions about the degree of consensus enjoyed by their own responses and those of others. Ross et al. suggested that people make more extreme and more confident dispositional inferences concerning people who behave differently from oneself. However, a substantive body of research focusing on how information about the self and more and less familiar others is processed suggests that people are more confident when they are asked to attribute dispositional traits to themselves and more familiar others as compared with unfamiliar others (see Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977) . Recent research on attribution confirms this view (Goldberg, 1981) .
A second factor that could affect the proposed relation between the perception of a false consensus and attributional preferences is the value or social desirability of one's own response and that of others. Research on the "positivity bias" has shown that people generally attribute positive behaviors to dispositional factors, whereas negative behaviors are attributed to situational factors. A number of studies confirmed this positivity bias both for self-attributions and other-attributions (e.g., Taylor & Koivumaki, 1976; Tillman & Carver, 1980; van der Pligt & Eiser, 1983) . This positivity bias is based on the finding that people are biased toward favorable evaluations (Warr, 1971; Zajonc, 1968) . Both Skinner (1971) and Frieze and Weiner (1971) have suggested that people tend to attribute behaviors with good consequences to internal factors and behaviors with bad consequences to external factors.
Research on the divergent-perspectives hypothesis and the false-consensus bias pays little or no attention to the influence of evaluative factors on people's attributions. One of the few exceptions is Zuckerman's (1978) study, which showed that the impact of consensus information on prediction of behavior was greater when social desirability of the consensus information was high rather than low, Ross et al. (1977) did not ask their subjects to evaluate the behavioral alternatives. In Study 1 reported by Ross et al., subjects made inferences about a number of hypothetical choice situations (e.g., paying vs. fighting a parking ticket, or choosing to work on an individual vs. group academic project). One of their studies (Study 4) presented subjects with a real conflict situation. In this study subjects were faced with a request to carry a sandwich board (with the message "Eat at Joe's" or "Repent") around campus. Unfortunately, participants in their studies were not asked to evaluate their own and the alternative response.
In this article we focus on actual, everyday behavior; subjects were asked to estimate the commonness of various behavioral alternatives, to rate the typical person choosing each of these alternatives on a number of trait-rating scales, and to evaluate the different behavioral options. One important difference with the Ross et al. study is that we focused on selfgenerated behavior, that is, behavior that requires individual effort and is not the result of a request made by the experimenter or his or her confederate. As a consequence, one would expect dispositional factors to be of more importance in our studies than in those reported by Ross et al.
Study 1
Both Studies 1 and 2 were part of a larger scale investigation of people's attitudes, knowledge, and behavior with regard to a number of environmental issues (e.g., the use of detergents and energy conservation).
Method
Study 1 presented subjects with questionnaires containing four pairs of behavior related to the above mentioned issues. Each pair contained one "conservationist" behavioral alternative and one relatively "nonconserva-•tionist." A total of 837 subjects participated in Study 1. All respondents were approached individually (at home) by a team of female interviewers. The respondents interviewed were those who (a) were responsible for running the household and (b) owned a washing machine and did their laundry at home. As a consequence, only a small proportion of males (less than 8%) was included. The four pairs of behavioral alternatives presented to subjects were • washing laundry, whites, at 90 °C (60 °C); • using (no-) phosphate laundry detergents; • (not) including a prewash; and • using a high (low) number of rinses. Subjects were asked to rate a person who would choose a particular option for each of the four pairs of alternatives. These ratings were made with respect to four personal characteristics. Subjects were randomly split into two samples; for Sample A (n = 414), the relevant traits were cleanliness, thoughtfulness, practicality, and social concern. For each trait a 100-mm rating scale was used; the two extremes of the four rating scales were labeled as follows: unhygienic-hygienic, thoughtful-thoughtless, impracticalpractical, and socially concemed-socially unconcerned. The four scales were selected so that both alternatives of a specific behavioral pair could be just as easily described in a favorable way as in an unfavorable way. In this way we attempted to provide an evaluatively balanced set of scales in order to prevent the possible confounding of trait ratings and evaluation. In order to test whether a different set of scales would result in the same findings, subjects in Sample B (n = 423) were presented with four different scales. The relevant traits were realism, cleanliness, environmental concern, and responsibility. The four (evaluatively balanced) scales were labeled as follows : unrealistic-realistic, clean-dirty, environment-conscious>-nonenvironment-consciouSf and irresponsible-responsible. After completing the relevant trait ratings, subjects were asked to state their own choice regarding each of the four behavioral pairs on a S-point scale ranging from: always choose (1) to never choose (5); the intermediate categories were usually choose, sometimes choose, and usually do not choose. This question was followed by a request to estimate the percentage of housekeepers in The Netherlands who would choose each particular alternative (the two alternatives of each pair added up to 100%). Finally, subjects were asked to indicate which of each pair of alternatives they thought to be better. The answer to this question was given on a S-point scale; the two alternatives were printed at the extremes of the scale. The response categories, scored from +2 to -2, were: Option A is much better, better, equally good, worse, or much worse than Option B.
Results
Preliminary analyses were performed to investigate whether the two samples differed from one another in trait ratings and perceived consensus due to the use of-different traitrating scales. These analyses showed no effect due to rating scales. In the analyses below, therefore, this factor is ignored.
Perception of consensus. The results presented in Table 1 provide strong support for the hypothesis that people who choose a particular response will rate that response as more probable for "people in general" than will subjects who choose the alternative response. The effect of subjects' own behavioral choice on their estimates of commonness was statistically significant for all four pairs of behavioral alternatives. The effect of subjects' own choice was tested in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the estimated commonness of each of the behavioral options as a dependent variable. Subjects were split into two groups, people who always or usually prefer Option A and people who always or usually prefer Option B. The middle category (people who sometimes choose Option A, sometimes Option B) was less relevant to the present hypotheses and excluded from the analysis. As a consequence, the ANOVAS for the four behaviors were based on different numbers of subjects. Thus, for the first item (washing temperature) we compared the estimated commonness of Option A for the two groups (44.8 vs. 30.8). Because the estimated commonness of Option B equals the difference between the estimated commonness of Option A and 100, the F test for the 44.8 versus 30.8 difference is identical to that for 55.2 versus 69.2. Thus, the .F values presented in Table 1 refer to both differences. Results shown in Table 1 clearly indicate that the subjects' reported behavioral choices exerted a large and consistent effect on their perceptions of behavioral consensus; that is, each of the response options is perceived as more common by those who have chosen that specific option than by those who have chosen the alternative.
Trait-inference ratings. According to Ross et al. (1977) , one would expect trait ratings to be more extreme for behavior that differs from one's own preferred behavioral alternative. To test this hypothesis, individuals' trait ratings were measured as absolute discrepancies from the midpoint of the 100-point Likert-type scale. Ratings for each pair of behavioral alternatives were combined to provide an overall measure of the rater's inferences about the "typical" actor who would choose each of the behavioral alternatives. Table 2 presents a summary of the results of Study 1.
The F ratios presented in Table 2 refer to the interaction F, that is, the comparison of the (A-B) difference for the two groups. This interaction F was used by Ross et al. (1977) and is in accordance with their emphasis on the relative terms in which the false-consensus hypothesis must be stated. In other words, if only one of the two groups would see the opposite choice as more revealing than their own choice, and the other group would show only a weak tendency in this direction, the hypothesis would still be confirmed, because the overall results would show a tendency to rate dissimilar behavior as more revealing. According to this hypothesis, we would expect the difference scores shown in Table 2 to be relatively more negative for the Option A group. However, the pattern of the trait ratings for the four behavioral pairs clearly contradicts Ross et al.'s findings. The difference scores presented in Table 2 show that in each case the differing response in extremity is more positive for the rater who chooses the conservationist option than for the rater who chooses the alternative nonconservationist option. Results show relatively strong inferences about the typical person who chooses the same behavioral alternative as the rater. The effect was most clearcut for the washing temperature item, F(l, 685) = 106.7, p < .001. The item concerning detergent use showed a difference in the same direction but nonsignificantly so, F(l, 684) = 3.2, .05 < p < .10. The remaining two items concerning prewash and number of rinses showed the same pattern, that is, more extreme trait ratings about the typical person who chooses the same behavioral alternative. Both items showed significant differences.
Results shown in Table 2 also indicate a clear main effect of subject group; the conservationist group (Option A) gives more extreme trait ratings to everyone. This effect is clarified by a closer inspection of subjects' mean trait ratings (i.e., the content of their trait attributions and not the strength as measured by the discrepancy from midpoint). These scores indicated that subjects opting for the conservationist alternative snowed the most pronounced differences in their trait profiles attributed to the two groups. The typical person choosing the conservationist option was described in extremely favorable terms: All attributions were clearly positive (thoughtful, responsible, etc.). The person opting for the nonconservationist option was favorably described in terms of cleanliness only; all other attributions were relatively negative in evaluative terms. The nonconservationist group's mean scores, on the other hand, were located more in the middle regions of the trait scales; the exception was their ratings in terms of hygiene and cleanliness. Attributions to the person opting for the nonconservationist option were generally more favorable (i.e., more hygienic, realistic, and practical), but the differences in the content of the traits attributed to the two groups were less marked than those obtained for the subjects choosing the conservationist options.
The effect of valence. To test the effects of the participants' evaluations of their own and the alternative behavioral choice, we conducted two analyses. The first focuses on the within-group effects (unlike the F ratios presented in Table 2 , which combined the withingroup effects and the between-group effects) and provides information concerning subjects' evaluations of the various behavioral alternatives. The second analysis tests whether subjects' own behavioral preference exerted an influence on their trait ratings beyond the effects of valence. Table 2 shows the results of eight paired comparisons of the trait ratings of each of the groups for the four behavior pairs and subjects' evaluation of the behavioral alternatives. The latter score is based on a question asking subjects to indicate how much better they thought Option A to be as compared with Option B, for each of the behavioral items. Results indicate that in six of the eight cases subjects made more extreme trait ratings when describing a person who chooses their own preferred behavioral alternative. In five of these six cases this effect reached statistical significance. Of the remaining two cases, one did not show a significant difference, whereas the subjects opting for the use of phosphate detergents showed a highly significant difference in the opposite direction. These subjects make more extreme trait inferences about the typical person who chooses the more conservationist option (use no-phosphate detergents) than about the typical person who chooses their own preferred response. Inspection of subjects' evaluation scores indicates that in all cases subjects think that their own choice is better than the alternative, except for the people who choose to use phosphate detergents. The latter group had a score of zero. As indicated in Table 2 , all other evaluative scores were significantly different from zero. In summary, results of Study 1 support the findings of Ross et al. (1977) concerning people's tendency to perceive a false consensus; that is, subjects overestimated the commonness of their own response relative to the alternative behavioral response. Our findings do not, however, provide any support for the hypothesis that people make more extreme and confident trait inferences about people whose response differs from one's own preferred behavioral response. Results showed that people generally make more extreme ratings about people who prefer the same behavioral alternative as oneself. At first sight these results seem to support findings obtained in the field of information processing that show that people make more extreme and confident tra t inferences about familiar others than aboit unfamiliar others. However, the finding tha.t people generally evaluate their own behavioral choice relatively favorably suggests that shrjilarity of behavior is not the only factor related to attributional extremity. Moreover, our finding that people make less extreme trait infetences about similar others when they do nQt evaluate this behavior positively could imply that evaluative factors provide a better explanation for our findings.
One way to test whether raters' own behavioral preference exerted an influence on their trait ratings beyond any effect that could be accounted for by their evaluation of the alternatives is to perform analyses of covariance (ANCOVAS), with subjects' evaluation as a covariate. We simply repeated the analyses presented in Table 2 with subjects' differing responses in extremity to Option A versus Option B as a dependent variable, their rating on how much better they thought Option A to be compared with B as a covariate, and their own behavioral preference as an independent variable. Results of these analyses are summarized in Table 3 and show that the effect of subjects' own behavioral choice remained significant for only one of the behavioral items (washing temperature). However, results concerning this item also showed a highly significant covariate, which led to a substantially lower F ratio due to subjects' own choice. The F value for the covariate was 71.9 versus 46.0 for subjects' own choice. Results for the item concerning the use of detergents showed no significant effects due to either subjects' own choice or their evaluation score. The two remaining items showed no significant effects due to subjects' own choice, whereas the AN-COVA resulted in a significant effect of subjects' evaluation of the two behavioral alternatives. The item concerning prewash showed a significant effect due to the covariate, F(l, 603) = 4.8, p < .05, and a nonsignificant effect of subjects' own choice (F = 1.9). Similarly, the last item (number of rinses) showed a significant covariate, F( 1,650) = 15.7, and no effect due to subjects' own choice (F -0.6). These analyses suggest a predominant influence of evaluative factors and are in accordance with research on the positivity bias, that is, that people tend to attribute positive behaviors to dispositional factors while attributing more negatively evaluated behaviors to situational factors.
In order to provide a further test of the effects of evaluative factors on attributional inferences, we conducted a second experiment in which we attempted to separate the contribution of evaluative factors from subjects' own behavioral choice. However, before we proceed with the description of this study, it is necessary to provide some information on the social context in which the present studies were conducted.
Of the four behavioral items used in Study 1, the issue concerning the use of phosphate detergents has received widespread attention in the Dutch media. Although residential energy consumption received considerable attention since the energy crisis in 1973, the latter discussion focuses on home heating, because this constitutes approximately 70% of the energy bill of the average household. It is not surprising, therefore, that the item concerning the use of phosphate detergents was the only one in which subjects choosing the nonconservationist option rated their own behavior relatively neutral. The remaining items showed that both groups rated their own behavior relatively favorably. In the second experiment we concentrated on behavioral aspects of home heating. In the light of the fact that this issue has been in the focus of public attention since 1973 and on the basis of the frequently reported finding that attitudes toward energy conservation are often more favorable than actual behavior (see, e.g., Seligman et al., 1979) , we expected a higher proportion of people rating their own behavior relatively unfavorably than in Study 1. In this way we hoped to distinguish further the effects of subjects' own behavioral choice from evaluative factors.
Study 2

Method
Study 2 presented subjects with a questionnaire containing four pairs of behavioral alternatives related to home heating and energy conservation. A total of 219 subjects participated in this experiment. The four pairs of behavioral alternatives presented to subjects were • thermostat (not) on lower temperature when temporarily not at home (e.g., shopping), • (not) looking at energy use when buying electric home appliances,
• (not) closing curtains on winter nights, and
• thermostat always lower (higher) than 21 °C when at home, Subjects were asked to rate a person who would choose a particular option for each of the four pairs of alternatives. These ratings were made with respect to the following four personality traits: practicality, thoughtfulness, thriftiness, and realism. The two extremes of the four rating scales were labeled as follows ; practical^-unpractical, thoughtlessthoughtful, thrifty-wasteful and unrealistic-realistic. After completing these ratings, subjects were asked to state their own choice regarding each of the four behavioral pairs on a 5-point scale ranging from always choose to never choose (see Study 1). Similar to Study 1, subjects were then asked to estimate the commonness of their behavior and, finally, to indicate which of each pair of alternatives they thought to be better.
Results
Perceptions of consensus. The percentage estimates made by subjects are summarized in Table 4 . The false-consensus effect was similar to the findings obtained in Study 1 for the first two behavioral items, F(\, 163) = 59.4, p < .001, and F(l, 171) = 41.1, p < .001, respectively. The remaining two pairs show no significant effect. Overall, findings provide reasonable support for the false-consensus bias, although the effect is less pronounced than in Study 1. In the analyses we excluded the subjects who sometimes chose Option A and sometimes Option B, hence the differing numbers of subjects for the four pairs of behaviors.
Trait-inference ratings. Individual trait ratings were again measured as absolute discrepancies from the midpoint of the 100-point scale. Ratings were summed over the four scales to provide an overall measure of the rater's inferences about the actor who would choose each of the behavioral alternatives. Results are summarized in Table 5 . Results show that the (A-B) difference in extremity is less positive for the rater who chooses the more conservationist alternative over the relatively nonconservationist option. All difference scores were positive, indicating that on average all subjects (irrespective of own behavioral choice) made more extreme trait inferences concerning actors who chose Option A. Furthermore, these difference scores were more positive for the raters opting for the nonconservationist option. These findings support Ross's hypothesis; that is, the difference score is more positive for the rater who chooses the second alternative over the first.
The pattern of the obtained differences is strikingly similar to that obtained by Ross et al. (1977, Studies 3 and 4) . Furthermore, present findings provide mixed support for the hypothesis that people tend to make more extreme and confident trait inferences about similar/familiar others than unfamiliar/lesssimilar others. The content (i.e., the mean traitratings) of the attributions made by the two groups were remarkably similar. The participants opting for the nonconservationist alternative generally rated this behavior slightly unfavorably on all four dimensions, whereas the person opting for the conservationist alternative was described in favorable terms. The conservationist subjects showed the same differences, but more extremely so. The typical person opting for the conservationist alternative was seen as very practical, realistic, thoughtful, and thrifty, whereas the negotiations of these traits were ascribed to the typical nonconservationist. The latter is in accordance with the fact that the Option A subjects made more extreme ratings to everyone, a finding we also obtained in Study 1.
Effect of valence. Table 5 also shows the results of the eight paired comparisons of trait inferences and their relation to subjects' evaluations of the behavioral alternatives. These results show that in two cases subjects made significantly more extreme trait inferences about a person who would choose their own preferred behavioral alternative. Results of all four behavioral items show that subjects choosing the less conservationist alternative made more extreme trait ratings concerning the typical person who would choose the alternative option. In other words, these findings are in accordance with Ross et al.'s finding that people ascribe more extreme traits to others who behave differently. However, subjects' evaluation scores reveal that subjects preferring the B alternative generally evaluate their own choice considerably less favorably than subjects who prefer the A alternative. The latter was clearly the case for Items 2 and 3; in both cases, the nonconservationist group rated the conservationist alternative to be better than their own as shown in the right-hand column of Table 5 . Both scores, 0.8 and 0.7 were significantly different from the neutral point of the scale (zero). However, even when the nonconservationist group rated their own behavior to be better than the conservationist alternative as on Items 1 and 4, their evaluation of their own choice in comparison with the alternative was significantly less favorable than the similar score for the conservationist group. For Item 1 both groups rated their own choice to be better, but the conservationist group more extremely so (1.5 vs. 0.4), ^1, 163) = 78.2, p < .001. Results on Item 4 showed a similar difference (1.0 vs. 0.4), F(l, 111) = 15.9, p< .001. These findings again suggest that evaluative factors play an important role in these attributional processes. The most intriguing aspect of these findings is that only the subjects choosing the nonconservationist Option B make more extreme trait ratings about others who behave differently. Those who prefer Op- tion A show a slight tendency in the opposite direction.
To test whether raters' own behavioral preference exerted an influence on their trait ratings over and above any effect that could be accounted for by their evaluation of the two alternatives, we conducted a number of AN-COVAS along the same lines as in the first study. Results of these analyses are shown in Table  6 and indicate a significant covariate for three of the four behavioral items. The first item concerning thermostat control showed no significant effect due to the covariate. The second behavioral item (buying electric home appliances) showed a significant covariate, F(l, 179) = 7.7, p < .01. The third and fourth item also showed a significant effect due to the covariate, F(l, 199) = 3.9, p < .05, and F(l, 111) = 7, l,p<.01, respectively. The inclusion of the covariate lowered the value of the F ratio due to subjects' own choice. However, the effects of subjects' own behavioral choice remained significant for the first three items; this effect only disappeared on the last item. Thus, these analyses again show the effect of evaluative factors on subjects' trait ratings, but this influence is less pronounced than in the first study. One possible reason for the weaker effects obtained in this study could be related to the fact that the range of subjects' evaluative scores was more restricted than in Study 1. The mean evaluative ratings shown in the right-hand column of Table 5 show much more intergroup agreement than those obtained in Study 1.
General Discussion
Considered together, the two studies offer strong support for the hypothesis that raters' perceptions of social consensus reflect their own behavioral choices. This hypothesis was clearly confirmed in Study 1, whereas results of Study 2 showed a similar, but less pronounced, effect.
Results of the first study quite consistently contradicted the hypothesis of Ross et al. that people make more extreme and confident inferences about others who choose a behavioral option that differs from one's own preferred alternative. Findings indicated that more extreme traits were ascribed to others who opt for the same alternative as the rater. Further analysis showed that subjects generally evaluated their own behavior as relatively favorable and that the perceived valence of one's behavior as compared with the alternative provided the best explanation of our findings. The only behavioral alternative that was not rated more favorably by subjects choosing the alternative (the use of phosphate detergents) also showed these raters making more extreme trait attributions to others opting for the positively valenced alternative option. Results of Study 2, on the other hand, provided consistent evidence that consensus estimates and corresponding trait inferences by subjects are negatively correlated, as predicted by Ross et al. (1977) . Contrary to the first study, subjects showed relative agreement concerning the valence of the various alternatives, irrespective of their own choice. Further analysis supported the results of the first study and showed significant effects of perceived valence of the behavioral alternatives on the extremity of trait attributions. However, present results also indicate that consensus perceptions have far less effect on individuals' attributional inferences than would be expected on the basis of the proposal of Ross et al. The presently reported research indicates that positive behaviors are seen as more dispositionally revealing than negative behaviors and that this positivity bias may eliminate or even reverse the findings reported by Ross et al. (1977) . Accordingly, it is clear that perceived valence is not independent of trait ratings.
Attributional Inferences and Valence
The results reported thus far showed that the generalization of Ross et al. does not seem to hold when positivity biases overcome it (Study 1) and fares quite well when one behavioral option is rated as more negative or only marginally more positive than the alternative by the subjects choosing this particular option.
Before the implications of the above results are discussed, it is worth noting that the overall effect of subjects' own behavioral choice was mainly due to one of the subject groups, both in our second study and in Studies 3 and 4 of Ross et al. In our study, the subjects choosing the "prosocial," conservationist option did not show marked differences in their trait ratings, whereas the nonconservationist respondents made more extreme trait ratings about the person choosing the conservationist option than about the person choosing the nonconservationist option. It could be argued that these subjects are in a similar position as those in Ross et al.'s study who were asked to carry a sandwich board. Both were under pressure to comply: In our study this pressure resulted from a consensually accepted norm (i.e., energy conservation is "good"); in Studies 3 and 4 of Ross et al. (1977) it resulted from the confederate, and possibly a more generally accepted norm (i.e., one should dare to walk around with a sandwich board). Further inspection of the content of the attributions by the respondents opting for the nonconservationist option suggests that they see their own response as relatively unreveah'ng and the opposite response as indicating positive, personal characteristics. Inspection of the favorability of trait attributions (valenced difference from midpoint summed over the four scales) showed that the subjects opting for the nonconservationist option in Study 2 rated others choosing the alternative option in more favorable and more extreme terms than others choosing their own preferred alternative. This was not the case in Study 1, where others choosing one's own alternative were rated in more positive terms than those choosing the other option. Interestingly, the only exception concerned the item on the use of phosphate detergents. In this case, the nonconservationists attributed more favorable and more extreme traits to others choosing the conservationist option than to others opting for their own choice. In summary, rating one's own behavioral preference favorably leads to more extreme and more favorable attributions to describe this particular behavior, whereas the alternative is, described in less favorable but also less extreme terms. However, when one engages in behavior that one sees as less desirable (the use of phosphates in Study 1 and the nonconservationist behaviors in Study 2), one tends to ascribe more extreme and more favorable traits to the alternative, relatively positive, behavior.
The present research, therefore, seems to point at the importance of the ego-defensive or dissonance-reducing function of attributional inference. In other words, subjects choosing the alternative that is less desirable according to a consensually accepted norm do not wish to see their own behavior as the result of personal characteristics and in this way deny responsibility ("it's only a habit"). Thus, engaging in behavior that is seen as negative or relatively neutral seems to lead to two distinct types of influence. First, one overestimates the degree of consensus for one's own response. Second, one does not relate this behavior to personal characteristics.
Nonmotivational Factors
The present research provides some evidence regarding the possibility that "selective exposure" effects are responsible for the impression that one's own judgments and responses enjoy a high degree of consensus. Our findings cannot speak for the influence of selective exposure on estimated commonness but suggests that selective exposure is unlikely to lead to the attributional effects predicted by Ross et al. First , this explanation would be inconsistent with evidence indicating that more extreme trait inferences are made about more familiar, similar others. Second, our findings suggest that evaluative factors are more important than similarity of behavior in attributional inferences.
Evaluative factors, in summary, play an important role in attribution processes. Present evidence suggests that it is necessary to take evaluative and motivational aspects into account in one's attempt to explain differences in attributional preferences. The major influence of evaluative factors in the present context can be summarized in the following points: (a) positively bias, that is, "good" behavior is generally regarded as being related to dispositional factors, whereas "bad" behavior is less likely to be interpreted in terms of personality characteristics, irrespective of one's own choice; (b) the attributional differences obtained by Ross et al. (1977) seem to apply best when people engage in relatively dissonant (i.e., negatively valenced) behaviors. We are thus suggesting that although cognitive biases may influence our perception of various behaviors, such biases do not explain the attributional preferences found in the present studies. The present research serves as a reminder that affective, motivational factors should be included in the study of false-consensus phenomena.
